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Is Economic Recovery a Myth? 





There is a lively debate on the persistence of the current banking crisis' impact on GDP. 
Impulse Response Functions (IRF) estimated by Cerra and Saxena (2008) suggest that the 
effects of earlier crises were long-lasting. We show that standard estimates of IRFs are highly 
sensitive to misspecification of the underlying data generation process. Direct estimation of 
IRFs by a methodology similar to Jorda's (2005) local projection method is robust to 
misspecifications of the data generation process but yields biased estimates when country 
fixed effects are added. We propose a simple method to deal with this bias, which we apply to 
panel data from 99 countries for the period 1974-2001. Our estimates suggest that an average 
banking crisis leads to an output loss of around 10 percent with little sign of recovery. GDP 
losses from banking crises are more severe for African countries and economies in transition. 
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The demise of Lehman Brothers left the world economy in a state of
disarray. Output in most OECD countries has declined by an order of
magnitude of 5 percent, a number unseen since World War II and the
Great Depression. Will output recover from this shock in the next ve to
ten years, or will (part of) the output loss be permanent? The Council
of Economic Advisors (CEA) has a clear view on this issue: \A key fact
is that recessions are followed by rebound. Indeed, if periods of lower-
than-normal growth were not followed by periods of higher-than-normal
growth, the unemployment rate would never return to normal." (Cited
in Greg Mankiw's blog of March 3, 2009).
This view is not shared by all economists. For example, in his joint
paper with John Campbell, Mankiw shows that there is little mean re-
version in output (Campbell and Mankiw, 1987) . By itself, this does
not automatically imply that the eect of a banking crisis will be per-
manent. GDP can be mixture of random processes, some of which have
a unit root, while others do not. Banking crises may aect the non-unit
root components of GDP, an idea paraphrased in the following passage
by Paul Krugman: \I always thought the unit root thing involved a bit
of deliberate obtuseness - it involved pretending that you didn't know the
dierence between, say, low GDP growth due to a productivity slowdown
like the on that happened from the 1973 to 1995, on one side, an low
GDP growth due to a severe recession." (Krugman's blog of March 3,
2009.) For Krugman, the conclusion that recessions have permanent ef-
fects is implied by the fact that long-run productivity growth follows a
random walk. Contrary to productivity growth, short-run uctuations
in the business cycle have largely temporary eects.
A recent paper by Valerie Cerra and Sweta Saxena (2008) that goes
under ominous tittle \The Myth of Economic Recovery" seems to settle
the debate in favour of Mankiw's view. The authors estimate a dynamic
model of GDP growth as a function of lagged growth rates and a dummy
for the occurrence of a banking crisis. They then iterate it several lags
ahead, using their regression estimates, to obtain the impulse-response
function (IRF) of GDP to a banking crisis event. As the tittle of their
paper suggests, the authors nd strong persistence of the initial negative
eect of banking crises.
However, their claim has not remained undisputed. Adam Elbourne
and Bert Smid (2009) show that slight changes in the specication of
Cerra and Saxena have a substantial eect on the estimated impulse
response of a banking crisis. Also, Xiaoming Cai and Wouter J. den
Haan (2009) question the conclusion that nancial crises have perma-
nent eects, arguing that it may be driven by the use of one-type-shock
2models. Since GDP itself is (close to) a random walk, there is at least
one type of shocks that has permanent eects, and hence, a one-type-
shock model will predict that any shock has permanent eects. They
therefore propose that one should estimate the eects of banking crises
on GDP components rather than the aggregate.
The current paper addresses both problems { the sensitivity of itera-
tive IRFs to misspecications in the underlying data generation process
(Elbourne and Smid, 2009) as well as the restriction that dierent types
of shocks aect GDP in the same way (Cai and Den Haan, 2009), implicit
in the one-type shock models. Our proposed solution to these problems
is to estimate the IRFs directly from the data, by regressing future val-
ues of GDP on the current GDP level and its lags, and the banking
crisis dummy. We apply a methodology similar to Oscar Jorda's (2005)
adapted for the special case of rare events such as banking crises. We
show that our approach yields consistent estimates of the IRFs for any
ARMA process of GDP, even when its structure is misspecied. More-
over, by directly estimating the IRFs from the data, our approach allows
us to relax the assumption that various types of shocks have the same
IRF, thus addressing the concerns of Cai and Den Haan (2009).
A potential weakness of our approach, to which iterative IRF calcu-
lation is also not immune, is that when country xed eects are added
in the regression model to account for unobserved heterogeneity in GDP
levels, the persistency of the banking crisis eect on output is underes-
timated. (It is well known (Arellano and Bond, 1991) that adding xed
eects leads to a downward bias in the estimate of the persistence of
shocks.) We develop a method to correct for this bias, applicable for
analysis of the impact of rare events that can be captured by a dummy
variable. The empirical application shows that it works well. On aver-
age, a banking crisis reduces GDP by up to 10 percent after ve years
on average, with little sign of recovery afterwards, though the impact
in Africa (and some transition economies) is much larger than in Non-
Africa { 14 percent for Africa compared to 6 percent for Non-Africa.
The setup of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory
of the estimation of IRFs, and Section 3 presents the empirical evidence.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Robust estimation of IRF
2.1 The simplest model: AR(1)
Our approach is to start with the simplest possible model and then to
add complications one by one. Consider the following AR(1) model:
yi;t+1 = 0 + 0!t + 1yi;t + 2di;t + ui;t+1; (1)
3where yi;t is log GDP per capita for country i in year t, di;t is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 at the start of a banking crisis and
zero otherwise, and the error term ui;t+1 is an i.i.d. random variable,
ui;t+1  N (0;2); in particular, banking crises are independent of all
forward and backward realizations of the error term: E[ui;sdi;t] = 0;8s;t.
The parameter 0! captures a deterministic time trend. We assume that
banking crises arrive randomly at a rate , so that E[di;t] = , see Cerra
and Saxena (2008) for some evidence on this issue.1 Consider a k-period
ahead forecast yi;t(k) conditional on the information available on time t:
yi;t(k) =0k + 0!kt + 1kyi;t + 2kdi;t; (2)


























For k = 1, we obtain model (1). Dene the IRF of a banking crisis as a
function of forecast period k;k  1 as
IRF(k) = E[yi;t+kjyi;t;di;t = 1]   E[yi;t+kjyi;t;di;t = 0]
Hence, IRF(k) = 2k. The standard approach to calculating 2k is to
estimate the parameters of model (1) and then use forecast rule (2). An
alternative approach would be to directly estimate a forecast rule for
each k > 0:











1 (di;t+k j   ):
Hence vit(k)  yi;t+k  yit(k), and vit(1) = uit. The latter approach can be
interpreted as estimating a reduced form model for forecasting. The co-
ecients 2k give direct estimates of the IRF of a banking crisis. These
estimates are consistent and unbiased since the error term vi;t(k) is un-
correlated to the explanatory variables. All `endogenous' variables {
realizations of yi;t+j and di;t+j between the date of forecasting t and the
date t+k for which log GDP per capita is forecasted { have been elimi-
nated by recursive substitution of model (1) and by replacing di;t+j with
its expectation.
1Strictly speaking, this assumption cannot be true, since a new banking crisis
cannot arrive as long as an old banking crisis is still going on. However, the arrival
rate of banking crisis is too low for this to be a serious problem.
4This approach has two advantages above the standard approach of
calculating the IRF analytically using forecast rule (2). The rst advan-
tage is the ease of computing standard errors of the IRF. The calculation
of the standard errors of the coecients in forecast rule (2) is cumber-
some, since the coecients mk are non-linear functions of the underlying
coecients m, increasingly so the further ahead the forecast. By di-
rectly estimating model (3), on the other hand, one obtains the standard
errors of mk straight away2.
Direct estimation, however, involves some loss in eciency. In the
appendix to this paper we prove for the case of 0 = 0! = 2 = 0 that
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when the IRF is estimated directly from the data. Figure 1 plots the
variances of b k
1 (the boxes) and b 1k (the crosses), and their ratio (the
circles) for 1 = 0:95. The eciency loss is not large, especially for
small k, and when compared to the large eects of specication errors
(see gure 2 below). Moreover, the analytical method of calculating
the variance of the IRFs can be extremely sensitive to tail risk in the
estimation. When 1 is close to unity, and when by some freak of nature,
b 1 is estimated to be greater than unity, the estimation error in the
IRF explodes. A direct estimation of the IRF does not suer from this
problem.
The second advantage of estimating the IRF directly from model (3)
is its robustness to misspecications of model (1). As a simple example,
consider the case where 0 = 0! = 2 = 0, but instead of AR(1) the
true data generating process is AR(3)
yi;t+1 = 1yi;t + 3yi;t 2 + ui;t+1: (4)
For the sake of the argument, we consider the case when the coecient
for yi;t 1 is zero and the coecient for yi;t 2 is much smaller in absolute
value than that for the yi;t: j3j  j1j; in fact, 3 is so much smaller
that it is insignicant and the econometrician therefore decides to use
2Even though ui;t is i.i.d. by assumption, vi;t(k) for k > 1 are correlated over
time, since the eect of shocks in either ui;t+m or di;t+m;1 < m < k are picked up
in vi;t(k). Hence, one has to apply White's robust standard errors.
5Figure 1: The variances of the estimates of b k
1 (box) and b 1k (cross),
and their ratio (circles)
the AR(1) specication. The probability limit of the estimated value of
1 is equal to3
plim(b 1) =
1
1   3 (1   1)
:
Figure 2 plots the IRF for the true AR(3) model (the line with boxes)
and the estimated AR(1) model (the line with crosses) for the case that
1 = 0:95 and 3 =  0:10. The estimated AR(1) model yields a much
higher persistence. If one uses the forecast rule (2) one will greatly
3We leave out the subscript i for convenience. Consider the general AR(3) model:
yt+1 = 1yt + 2yt 1 + 3yt 2 + ut+1;
Consider the variance of the left and right hand side of three versions of the equation
above, rst the equation as it stands, second the equation with 1yt brought to the
left hand side, and third the version with 1yt+2yt 1 brought to the left hand side.



























Var(yt)   21 (1 + 2)Cov(yt+1;yt) + 22Cov(yt+1;yt 1) = 2
3Var(yt) + 2:





Taking lim2 ! 0 yields the expression in the text.
6overstate the persistence of the shock, whereas estimating equation (3)
directly yields a consistent estimate.
Figure 2: The IRFs from the AR(3) (box) and AR(1) (cross) models
A form of misspecication that is particularly relevant for model (1)
is the implicit assumption that the persistence of shocks in dit and uit
is the same, since both aect future values of yi;t+k via the term 1yit.
Consider the following extreme example where the eect of a banking
crisis dies out in a year:
yi;t+1 =xi;t+1 + zi;t+1;
zi;t+1 =1zi;t + ui;t+1;
xi;t+1 =2 (di;t   ):
If instead, the econometrician estimated model (1) (under the restriction




1 + (1   )2
2 (1   2
1) 2:
4Since



















7For example, if 1 = 0:95 and (1   )2
2 (1   2
1) 2 = 0:50, the
econometrician would conclude that the rate of decay of the eect of a
banking crisis would be 1   0:95=1:5 = 0:36, while in fact the rate of
decay is unity, which is the answer he would have got if he had used the
direct approach of estimating equation (3).
2.2 A generalization of the argument
The argument that direct estimation of the IRF is robust to misspec-
ication can be generalized. Consider an ARMA(R;M) equivalent of











Set 30 = 1 as a convenient normalisation of Var[ui;t]. For R = 1;L =
1;M = 0, model (5) is equal to model (1) with 1 = 11 and 2 = 21.
We assume that s are such that the process is stationary. Given this
assumption, the lagged values of yi;t+1 can be eliminated from the model
by innite recursive substitution of lagged versions of equation (5):
yi;t+1 = 0 + 0!t +
1 X
l=1




where the -parameters can be expressed as functions of the -parameters;
30 = 30 = 1. yi;t+1 can therefore be written as a linear function of all
past shocks di;t    and ui;t from now till minus innity. Hence, since
E[di;t   ] =E[ui;t] = 0,
yi;t(k) = 0 + 0! (t + k   1) +
1 X
l=k





The shocks hitting GDP between time t and time t + k will not aect
the forecasted level of output, yit(k), since they are uncorrelated to past
shocks. By applying the denition of the IRF of a banking crisis, it is
easy to see that IRF(k) = 2k. For R = 1;L = 1;M = 0, we have
2k = 2k. We can now reverse the recursive substitution procedure, by
solving equation (5) for uit and using that equation to eliminate uit and
its lags from equation (7), resulting in the following model:






2kldi;t+1 l + vi;t(k); (8)
where the -parameters can be expressed as functions of the -parameters,
and vi;t(k) is the error term uncorrelated with the other right-hand-side
8variables. This error term can be written as a function of the shocks ui;s












Again, vi;t(1) = ui;t+1. For an AR(R) model, this equation can be sim-
plied to






2kldi;t l + vi;t(k); (10)
Using 30 = 1, it is easy to show that
2k1 = 2k:
Hence, OLS on equation (10) yields a consistent estimate of IRF(k) =
2k1. Suppose that the econometrician uses model (3) instead of model
(10). Then, he would obtain consistent estimates of 2k, since lagged
values of yi;t are linear functions of lagged values of di;t and ui;t only and
since these lagged shocks are uncorrelated to di;t. Direct estimation of
the IRF is therefore robust to misspecication of either R; or L; or M.
2.3 Fixed eects
Model (5) assumes the GDP per capita in all countries to be at the same
level. To relax this assumption, country xed eects may be added to
the model. It is well known (Arellano and Bond, 1991) that estimating
model (5) with xed eects by OLS yields biased estimates, as the xed
eect soaks up part of the persistence of shocks, hence underestimating
j1j. Part of this bias spills over to the estimate of the banking crisis
eect, 2. Consider a simplied version of model (5) with xed eects:
yi;t+1 = 0i + 1yi;t + 2di;t + ui;t+1
The xed eects estimation involves running OLS on the original model
specied in deviations from country means:
e yit1 = 1e yit0 + 2e dit0 + e uit1; (11)
where e zits = zi;t+s zis, and zis is the mean of variable z over the period
t = 1+s;T. Let us concentrate on the bias to 2, for which purpose we
partition equation (11) using Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and estimate
Me yit1 = 2M e dit0 + Me uit1; (12)
9where M = I  e yit0(e y0
it0e yit0) 1e y0
it0 is the orthogonal projection matrix (so
that Me yit0 = 0). After some algebra, the expected value of the OLS
estimate of 2 will be







i0ui1 > 2 (13)
Assuming a negative eect of banking crisis on output, that is 2 < 0
and e d0
it0e yit0 < 0, and noting that y0
itui;t+1 > 0 by denition, equation
(13) implies that adding xed eects to dynamic model (5) leads to
the estimate of the eect of banking crisis being attenuated. However, a
relatively long T and further lags of dependent variable in our regressions
will mitigate this bias (Phillips and Sul, 2007; Judson and Owen, 1999).
Yet, there is another bias which is specic to our case as we will
now demonstrate. For the ease of illustration, we consider the simple
AR(1) model (equation (1)), although the same argument will apply to
the more general model (5). Rewrite model (1) and its forecast rule (3)
allowing for country xed eects, 0i, and for the arrival rate of banking
crises, i, to dier by country:
yi;t+k = 0ik + 0!kt + 1kyi;t + 2kdi;t + vi;t(k): (14)
Similarly, one can adapt equation (3), and the AR(1) equivalents of
equations (6), and (10) by replacing 0k by 0ik, 0 by 0i; and 0 by 0i
respectively and by replacing  by i. We shall refer to these equations
below as if we have allowed for a country-specic xed eect.
Consider a forecast k periods ahead made at time t. Taking the
expectation of yi;t+k over all shocks uis;t < s < t + k over the forecast
period, t+1 to t+k, but retaining the realisations of banking crisis, di;s
for s  t + k   1 yields:
y





That is, a forecast k periods ahead made at time t will not only be
aected by the banking crises happened at or before t, but also by bank-
ing crises happening at any future date within the forecast interval. In
equation (10),
Pk 1
l=1 2ldi;t+k l, which ends up in the error term vi;t(k),
is oset by term , so that E[vi;t(k)] = 0. However, in equation (14)
transformed into deviations from country means the error term e vi;t(k) no






2ldi;t+k l < 0: (15)
10(The last inequality is based on the assumption the the eect of banking
crisis on output is negative.) The quantity in (15) will be soaked up by
the estimated xed eects, resulting in a reduction (in absolute value)
of the estimate for 2k to compensate5. As can be seen, the bias to the
xed eects estimates increases with k.
We can eliminate the bias in (15) by retaining the forward lags of dit
in the forecast equation (10):













where the "-parameters can be expressed as functions of the underlying
-parameters, and v
i;t(k) is the error term vi;t(k) conditional on the in-
formation available at time t and the information on the occurrence of
banking crises between t and t + k.
Interestingly, equation (17) yields estimates, not only of 2k, but also
of 2l for l = 1;k   1. This suggests a further step, where all 2k's are
estimated in one simultaneous regression. An alternative estimator of
IRF(k) is obtained by eliminating all lags of yi;t from the right hand side
of equation (17) (cf. equation (7)):






The advantage of estimating equation (18) rather than equation (17) is
that (18) yields estimates of 2k free from the bias due to the lagged
dependent variable. The disadvantage is that controlling for yit and its
lags would improve the precision of the estimate of 2k. Equations (17)
and (18) yield independent estimates for 2l that should be equal con-
ditional on the model. The equality of these estimates could therefore
be used for a specication test. How many lags of the banking crisis
dummy to include in the feasible specication of model (18) is an empir-
ical question. In our regression analysis, we observe that the estimated
2k's stabilise when the number of lags of di;t exceeds 18.
5An alternative to transforming equation (14) into deviations from the country
means is to dierence it and run OLS on
yi;t+k   yi;t = 0!k + 1k4yi;t + 2k4di;t + vi;t(k) (16)
This transformation will not solve the problem either, since the error term, vi;t(k),
will include all the banking crises happening between t and k leading to the same
problem as in the xed eects case considered earlier.
113 Empirical estimates of the IRFs
3.1 Data
Our dataset is compiled from several sources. The data on banking crises
come from Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel (2003), observations
available from 1974 to 2001. Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and
Aten, 2006) provide GDP data from 1960 onwards. The complete data
are available for a panel of 99 countries. The average length of a time
series depends on the forecast length and ranges from 24 (one year after
a banking crisis) to 15 observations (ten years after). There have been 89
banking crises within our sample. The majority of countries (56) had one
banking crisis, twenty-eight countries had no crisis, thirteen countries
had two, one country had three, and one four banking crises. There is
a signicant negative correlation (r =  0:35) between the frequency of
banking crises and a country's GDP level, suggesting that a country-
specic banking crisis arrival rate i is a useful generalization. Our
assumption that the likelihood of a banking crisis is time-invariant seems
to be tolerated by the data as there is no signicant time trend.
3.2 The impulse response functions estimates
In table 1 we report estimates of the IRFs to a banking crisis from the
various specications we considered above. We start with the speci-
cation in levels without and with country xed eects (equations 10
and 14), proceeding then to the specication in growth rates (equation
16), with each specication estimated with and without the leads of the
banking crisis dummy. Every specication includes four lags of log GDP
or its growth rate, four lags of the banking crisis dummy (R = L = 4),
and a linear time trend for the specications in levels. We test the choice
of these lag lengths and nd them adequate (see table 3 below).
All specications paint a similar picture of the GDP loss within the
rst few years after the start of a banking crisis, but diverge thereafter.
The dierences in the IRF estimates for the eect of banking crisis ob-
served in the medium to long run can be explained through our models
developed in the previous sections. The specications with leads of the
banking crisis dummy produce larger estimates than those without, be-
cause of the eects of the crises happening outside the forecast base
period between R and T  k  1. These eects are captured by banking
crisis leads, when these are included, or absorbed by the constant term
or xed eects when not, biasing them downward and leading to un-
derestimated IRFs to compensate or the downward bias in the constant
term. The dierence in estimates between the specications with and

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































13period, again as predicted, because the bias due to banking crises over
the forecast base period increases with k.
The other source of the bias to the IRF estimates is due to the inclu-
sion of lags of the dependent variable. This bias appears when we include
country xed eects, as can be seen by comparing the specications in
GDP levels with and without xed eects. The dierence between the
two specications is not entirely due to the lagged dependent variable
bias, since when country xed eects are present, as is most certainly
the case here, the specication which ignores them unduly attributes
their inuence to the observed variable { the banking crisis dummy {
thus overestimating its eect. However, that the specication in growth
rates, which fares only slightly better than that in levels with xed ef-
fects in terms of the bias, brings the IRF estimates closer to the levels
without xed eects specication suggests that the lagged dependent
variable bias is the major reason for the results in columns 1 and 3 to
dier. The specication where lags of GDP are replaced with a long
series of banking crisis dummies is free from this bias, and as a result is
estimates are larger. This specication is also free from the bias due to
non-inclusion of the banking crises outside the forecast base period that
we addressed in the previous paragraph, since it includes information
on practically all the banking crises that happened. Therefore, the es-
timates from this specication are the most unbiased of all, albeit least
precise.
The IRF estimates in table 1 imply that banking crises lead to large
and prolonged output losses, and that recovery, if any, is a distant and
uncertain prospect. The following gure 3 illustrates the 95% condence
interval bounds for our preferred specication (18). We see that, even
though a complete recovery is within the range of possibilities, sustained
losses are more likely. The point estimate for the cumulative GDP loss
ten years after the crisis of around 9 percent. To put this estimate
into perspective, consider that the median growth rate observed in our
sample is roughly 3% per year, so that the median economy would have
grown by 34% over ten years. Thus, a single episode of a banking crisis
can cost, on average, about a quarter of country's long-term growth
potential.
To appreciate how statistically important banking crises are in ex-
plaining the variation in output, we calculate in table 2 the share of
residual variance in log GDP explained by the banking crisis dummies
in the specication with xed eects and banking crises leads. (Doing
the same exercise with our preferred specication is statistically incor-
rect, since all explainable variance in output would be explained through
banking crises, provided we look long enough back.) We nd that, start-
14Figure 3: Predicted GDP loss from a banking crisis, and its 95% con-
dence interval.
Table 2: Share of residual variance in log GDP explained by banking
crisis
k k
1 0.010 6 0.063
2 0.019 7 0.072
3 0.027 8 0.081
4 0.038 9 0.087
5 0.050 10 0.087
ing with a humble 1% in the next year, banking crises explain just under
9% of log GDP's residual variance in the long run. For a relatively rare
event such as a banking crisis, this share is quite high.
3.3 Robustness checks
As our model predicts, our regression results are fairly robust to the
choice of lag length. In table 3 we test whether further lags of GDP
improve the explanatory power of the model. The restrictions to a lag
length of four hold at reasonable levels of signicance for all specica-
tions except for the case of levels with xed eects. The robustness of
our estimates to the number of lags included in the model contradicts
with the result reported by Elbourne and Smid (2009), that IRFs are
sensitive to the number of lags. However, their result is obtained using
standard recursive method for calculating IRF's, and the robustness of
15our results to lag length may be thought of as yet another illustration of
the robustness of our method. Moreover, for our preferred specication
with a potentially innite number of lags of the banking crisis dummy
the choice of lag length is not even an issue.
Our results are also robust to the assumption that part of the ob-
served negative eect of a banking crisis on output is in fact a correction
of excessive growth in the period of an expectations bubble. We can test
whether there is some currency in this view by including future banking
crises in model (18). The results in table 4 do not suggest a major prob-
lem with the interpretation of our regression results as estimated GDP
losses from banking crisis, rather than a cyclical correction, since the
estimates for the GDP eects from future banking crises are not nearly
signicant.
Finally, because banking crises sometimes coincide with war, social
unrest, major political reform or other disturbing events which conse-
quences for output are hard to isolate, our estimates may be vulnerable
to a lack of appropriate controls. We can, however, rerun our regressions
on the sample excluding Africa and some transition countries known to
be hard hit by these problems. We therefore divide our sample into the
subsamples of countries of the African continent (41 countries), coun-
tries in transition (4) and the rest, and run our preferred specication
on the African and the rest subsamples separately (table 5 and gure 4).
Looking at Figure 4 we observe that African countries lose more output
than the rest of the sample but experience stronger recovery at the end
of the ten-year period. The IRFs for the African subsample are also
much less precisely estimated than the rest of the sample; hence when
we exclude them the estimates become more precise as compared with
table 1.
4 Concluding remarks
The impact of banking crises on future GDP have been heavily debated
by economists. The evidence in Cerra and Saxena (2008) shows strong
persistence in the eect of banking crisis, but their results have been
disputed by other economist, see, among others, Krugman's blog, El-
bourne and Smid (2009) and Cai and Den Haan (2009). The problem is
that their methodology is sensitive to misspecications of their dynamic
model, which in practice are always there. In particular, for longer
forecast periods, these specication errors are likely to have substantial
eects. We apply an alternative method which is robust to these speci-
cation errors. We nd indeed that our regression results are robust to

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Table 4: Output loss before the start of a banking crisis
Dependent variable log GDP





Note: results based on specication (18)
Although we have applied a dierent method, our results are consis-
tent with the ndings of Cerra and Saxena (2008) that the loss from a
banking crisis is likely to last for a long time, especially for richer coun-
tries. Our ndings suggest that an average banking crisis may cause an
output loss of around 9 percent over a period of ten years from its start.
Even though estimates for more distant future are increasingly impre-
cise, output is unlikely to return to its pre-crisis path. The consequences
of banking crises vary by country. Thus, comparing the IRF estimation
results on the two sub-samples of our data { Africa versus the rest {
we nd that in African countries banking crises are quite devastating,
whereas in non-African countries (which are mainly rich world because
of long time series required for our method) output loss is not as strong.
18Table 5: Impulse response estimates by subsample of countries
African countries (41) The rest, excluding transition countries (54)
Specication eq. (17) eq. (18) eq. (17) eq. (18)
Years
after crisis
1 -0.033** -0.040 -0.028*** -0.024
2 -0.068** -0.075 -0.053*** -0.021
3 -0.084*** -0.121 -0.056*** -0.041*
4 -0.108*** -0.124 -0.062*** -0.059**
5 -0.104** -0.103 -0.069*** -0.094***
6 -0.118** -0.138 -0.081*** -0.088***
7 -0.153*** -0.198 -0.087*** -0.088***
8 -0.132** -0.195 -0.076*** -0.082***
9 -0.137** -0.188 -0.066*** -0.061**
10 -0.108 -0.124 -0.063*** -0.071***
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205 Appendix
We drop the subscript i throughout this appendix to simplify notation.
We have:




























The variance estimator for 1 reads:
















































where we use the moment generating function of the normal distribution
in the second line, see Mood, Graybill, and Boes (1974, p.540). We have:
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The second line uses X0X = (T   k)Var(yt) and writes the covariance
matrix X0V X as the sum of the terms on the main diagonal and two
times the k   1 diagonal along both sides of the main diagonal that
account for the MA part of the error term. The third line use the
expression for Var(yt) and expresses vt(k) and yt in terms of (lags of) ut.
The fourth line uses the fact that E(utut+k) = 0 for k 6= 0, so that we
can drop these terms. The fth line takes the expectation. The nal
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